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INTRODUCTION 
 We, as humans, are social beings who through our interactions in the world demonstrate a 
compulsion to attribute the richness of our own internal mental lives to others. As professor of 
psychology and neuroscience Michael Graziano puts it, “when [we] talk to someone, [we] have an 
automatic impression of thoughts, emotions and awareness emanating from that person” 
(Graziano, 1). This automatic impression allows us to reasonably theorize about the other’s 
thoughts, beliefs and feelings as mental states, and grasp the underlying motivations of their 
behaviors in our interactions with them (Byom and Mutlu, 2013). In philosophical discourse, the 
issue of whether we attribute mental states or minds to others is generally referred to as Theory of 
Mind (TOM) (Byom and Mutlu, 2013). Further, TOM also encompasses the issue of how we 
attribute mental states or minds to others (Byom and Mutlu, 2013).  
When addressing those issues encompassed in TOM there are two possible explanations. 
One possibility is that we all have a formed universal folk psychological theory of how the mind 
works, which informs the way in which we attribute mental states to others. According to this 
possibility, we all construct a general model of the mind, as to infer from a token behavior the 
mental state [of the other]” (Deonna and Nanay, 2014). This assumes that a particular expression 
or behavior of the other equates to a mental state of our own with which we are already familiar, 
based on the general model, and is known as the theory theory (Deonna and Nanay, 2014). Another 
possibility is that we all have the capacity to simulate and project our own mental states onto 
others. That is, that we all run a simulation of our thoughts, beliefs and feelings given a set of 
circumstances, and project them onto others (Deonna and Nanay, 2014). Colloquially put, we are 
able to put ourselves in the other’s shoes. This is the simulation theory, and it assumes that our 
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imagination is accurate in simulating, predicting and projecting our own mental states onto others 
(Deonna and Nanay, 2014).  
 Both the theory theory and the simulation theory are generally accepted as longstanding 
separate models of TOM. More recently, however, they are no longer treated as conflicting views; 
instead, they are treated as “different means at our disposal to make sense of others as 
psychological beings” (Deonna and Nanay, 2014). Making sense of others as psychological beings 
requires a consideration of who the proper subjects of investigation are, when asking who or what 
belongs to the category of psychological beings. Psychological beings are those to whom we 
attribute mental states. Thus, it is evident that other humans, to whom we consistently attribute 
mental states, either through the theory theory or the simulation theory, are psychological beings. 
However, it seems a number of nonhuman animals (hereafter: animals) should not be overlooked 
when asking who or what are psychological beings (Vitti, 2010). Indeed, many of us extend our 
desire to attribute our rich internal mental life to others to a number of animals. That is, similar to 
how Graziano describes human-human interactions, in human-animal interactions we also seem 
to have an impression of thoughts, emotions and awareness emanating from animals.  
The tendency to attribute mental states to animals, along with the impression of a rich 
internal life in animals, motivates several questions central to the literature on animal cognition:  
1. Do animals have mental states or minds? 
2. Are animals conscious? 
a. If not all, are some animals conscious? (Which can also be formulated as: 
what is the distribution of consciousness across the animal kingdom?) 
3. What is animal consciousness like?  
Each of these questions asks whether the impression of mental states in animals is an impression 
of something that exists independently of us, or, alternatively, if it is a mere appearance resulting 
from how we understand our own minds. Furthermore, those questions specifically concerning 
consciousness, are both deeply scientific and philosophical in nature, and demand that theories of 
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consciousness provide a means of distinguishing between animals which are and are not conscious 
(Andrews, 52).  
 In the literature on animal cognition, the phenomenon of consciousness is commonly 
described “in terms of qualia – how things feel – awareness” (Andrews, 52). The term ‘qualia’ is 
derived from the Latin ‘quālis,’ meaning “of what kind,” and thereby makes reference to the 
subjective qualities or aspects of mental states (Mandik, 3). However, consciousness by its own 
nature is rather complex; it is understood in a variety of ways by different philosophers, and as 
such suffers from muddled connotations (Cartmill, 2000). The most prominent and oft-recognized 
definition of animal consciousness stems from Thomas Nagel’s writing, which focuses on the 
question of “what it is like” to be animal X (Nagel, 1974). Nagel argues “an organism or process 
can be said to be conscious if there is something that it is like to be that organism or to be 
undergoing that process; [and so what is] essential to consciousness is its phenomenal, experiential, 
or qualitative feel” (Vitti, 2010). Here, Nagel focuses purely on consciousness in the phenomenal 
sense, which is unsurprisingly termed ‘phenomenal consciousness,’ and thought to encompass “the 
qualitative nature of experience” (Andrews, 52).  
 Phenomenal consciousness, however, does not encompass the phenomenon of self-
consciousness. Indeed, self-consciousness differs from phenomenal consciousness in an important 
way, as demonstrated by Kristen Andrews in the following passage:  
This distinction [between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness] is 
important because it may be that one can have conscious experience without being 
self-conscious of that experience – individuals may experience pain without 
reflecting on the pain experience. (Andrews, 52)  
Here, how self-consciousness is conceived of in the philosophical discourse becomes clearer. Self-
consciousness is consciousness-of-consciousness, or the “ability to reflect upon [one’s] conscious 
experience and thoughts” (Andrews, 52). It seems this is an ability of a higher kind, such that not 
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all animals who are conscious are also self-conscious. Thus, the question arises: which animals are 
self-conscious, and which are not? Secondary to this question, another asks: what is the 
phylogenetic distribution of self-consciousness in the animal kingdom? To answer these questions, 
a theory of self-consciousness must provide a means of distinguishing between animals which are 
and who are not self-conscious. In this project, I aim to develop such a theory. I propose that there 
are three conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient for an animal to be self-conscious, 
those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication, and (3) collaborative social play. 
Indeed, I find that these conditions are each individually necessary and jointly sufficient, such that 
if an animal meets all three conditions, they must be self-conscious. Likewise, if an animal is self-
conscious, they necessarily meet all three conditions.  
I begin this project with an extended discussion of the phenomenon of self-consciousness. 
In the first chapter, I carefully consider how self-consciousness ought to be defined and 
demonstrate the foundational aspects of the phenomenon from which the three proposed conditions 
arise. In the second chapter, I argue that only those animals whose nervous systems have the 
capacity for centralized attention meet the first condition set forth for animal self-consciousness, 
that being a complex nervous system. Through the investigation of the appearance and evolution 
of the nervous system in the animal kingdom, I find that it is only the third stage of complexity, 
centralized attention, which is adequately complex for self-consciousness. In the third chapter, I 
argue that only those animals whose communicative utterances fit the intentional account of 
communication meet the second condition set forth for animal self-consciousness, that being 
communication. Indeed, I explore three different accounts of animal communication and find that 
the Gricean interpretation of the intentional account points towards a sense of self, and as such the 
emergence of self-consciousness. Meanwhile, in the fourth chapter, I consider two forms social 
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play and argue that only those animals who demonstrate the self-handicapping and role-reversal, 
meet the third condition set forth for animal self-consciousness, that being collaborative social 
play. In the fifth and final chapter, I anticipate some potential objections to my proposal. I 
investigate some of the traditional criticisms against each of the three conditions, those being (1) 
a complex nervous system, (2) communication, and (3) collaborative social play, and aim to 
demonstrate that by treating the three conditions as necessary and jointly sufficient, my proposal 
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CHAPTER 1 
 In this chapter, I provide an extended discussion of the phenomenon of self-consciousness; 
how it ought to be defined and the role it plays in animal cognition more generally. As seen in the 
introduction, self-consciousness is often characterized as consciousness-of-consciousness; yet this 
definition is too broad for its investigation throughout this project. Thus, I turn to the work of 
Bekoff and Sherman, who detail an account of the varying degrees of self-knowledge in the animal 
kingdom, of which self-consciousness is the highest degree (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). 
According to Bekoff and Sherman, self-knowledge refers to an animal’s capacity of having a sense 
of self, which can be mapped across a continuum ranging from self-referencing to self-awareness 
to self-consciousness (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Through the consideration of this continuum, 
I aim to establish the exact nature of self-consciousness with which this project concerns itself 
with. Furthermore, I hope to demonstrate the foundational aspects of the phenomenon from which 
the three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, those being (1) a complex nervous system, 
(2) communication and (3) collaborative social play, arise.    
 
1.1 Self-Consciousness: Dichotomy or Continuum  
When exploring a means of distinguishing between which animals are and are not self-
conscious, one question in particular seems to be related; should self-consciousness be conceived 
of as a binary phenomenon, or does the phenomenon admit degrees (Allen and Trestman, 66)? In 
order to answer this question about self-consciousness, specifically, it is helpful to turn to the 
philosophical considerations of the same question about consciousness more generally. Those who 
ascribe to the view that consciousness is binary embrace the idea that it is dichotomous by nature 
(Allen and Trestman, 66). According to this view, an animal either is or is not conscious, as an all 
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or nothing perspective (Allen and Trestman, 66). However, this dichotomous view immediately 
imposes limitations on the way in which one aims at distinguishing between which animals are 
and are not self-conscious. Indeed, it renders necessary the determination of where to draw the 
line of consciousness. Thus, it asks the following questions: what is the line of consciousness and 
how do we settle on it? These are questions which point to the issue of how one ought to 
operationalize consciousness. One might wonder whether the line depends entirely on the 
observable behaviors of an animal, or if they include neurobiological substrates? Or perhaps, could 
it be a combination of both? For example, what happens if the criteria for consciousness includes 
a necessary condition of behavior X, yet an animal does not exhibit behavior X, not because it is 
not conscious, but rather because the criteria is misguided. Or for example, what happens in terms 
of neurobiological substrates; how does one determine whether the neurobiological substrates of 
the animal are the same or sufficiently similar to humans to extrapolate that they are conscious. 
These examples highlight that any determination of the criteria for consciousness would be rather 
arbitrary. Moreover, they raise the question if it could ever be known whether those are the right 
criteria. Thus, conceiving of consciousness as binary is unconvincing. That is, if self-
consciousness is binary, as an all or nothing phenomenon, then it would seem that a determination 
of criteria for consciousness is necessary. But this determination, as seen above, comes at a serious 
cost to the question of how to operationalize consciousness. So, it would be better to reject the idea 
of consciousness as a binary phenomenon and, instead, to conceive of it as admitting degrees.   
As before, it is helpful to turn to the considerations of consciousness more generally when 
exploring whether self-consciousness admits degrees. One of the first philosophers to express that 
consciousness might be best conceived of in terms of degrees was Charles Darwin. In The Descent 
of Man, Darwin claims: 
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The difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly 
is one of degree and not of kind. We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the 
various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, 
imitation, reason, &c., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even 
sometimes in a well-developed condition (Darwin, 1889).   
In this passage, Darwin states the differences in minds are ‘of degree and not of kind,’ such that 
the Darwinian approach suggests that an animal either is or is not conscious, and that different 
animals likely exhibit varying degrees of consciousness. Thus, this approach is inconsistent with 
the binary view, and supports the view which finds that the conception of consciousness as 
admitting degrees provides a better an explanation for the observed range of behaviors, senses, 
intuitions, emotions and faculties across the animal kingdom.  
 Contemporary philosophers, such as William Lycan and Daniel Dennett, follow suit from 
Darwin and also subscribe to the view that consciousness admits degrees. They embrace the view 
that, across the animal kingdom, consciousness occurs on a spectrum (Allen and Trestman, 66). 
For example, Lycan provides a functionalist account of the mind, in which “consciousness is 
internal monitoring… [and] consists in the operation of inner sense” (Gertler, 1998). This ‘inner 
sense’ view, as Brie Gertler calls it, allows Lycan to defend his near paradoxical account, in which 
“there is a meaningful sense in which a system with a minimal degree of consciousness is not 
‘really’ conscious” (Allen and Trestman, 66). This view emphasizes the notion of the phenomenon 
occurring on a spectrum, in which different animals might possess different degrees of 
consciousness. Similarly, Dennett, who believes consciousness is merely an illusion, argues that 
consciousness must admit degrees on the basis that any claim to the contrary would depend on an 
outdated assumption of a dividing line; one that distinguishes arbitrarily between animals who are 
and who are not conscious (Dennett, 1995). Through Dennett’s argument it is evident that the view 
claiming consciousness admits degrees overcomes the limitations seen above in the binary view; 
namely the arbitrary nature of criteria which would decide where to draw the line of consciousness. 
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It seems, then, that the phenomenon of self-consciousness might best be conceived of as admitting 
degrees.  
 However, it is probable that self-consciousness itself does not admit degrees, and that 
instead, it itself is the highest degree of some conscious capacity. Indeed, this is the view taken by 
Bekoff and Sherman in their article entitled “Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some 
Reflections.” Bekoff and Sherman argue that self-consciousness is the highest degree of an 
animal’s capacity of having a sense of self, a capacity to which they refer to as self-knowledge 
(Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). The central hypothesis put forward in their text is “that species [of 
animals] exhibit different degrees of self-cognizance [or self-knowledge], which reflect variations 
in their social environments and life histories” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Thus, Bekoff and 
Sherman propose that self-knowledge admits degrees, and can be mapped across a continuum 
ranging from self-referencing to self-awareness to self-consciousness (Bekoff and Sherman, 
2004). The point on the continuum at which an animal is located, and as such the level of self-
knowledge it exhibits, is determined by the extent to which they “benefit from reflecting on their 
own behaviors in light of the previous responses of conspecifics, and dynamically and adaptively 
adjusting their future behaviors accordingly” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). This can otherwise be 
understood as the extent to which they are consciously involved in reflecting on the outcomes of 
their behaviors in their interactions with others, and the probability that they will adjust that 
behavior to their benefit in the future. A close examination of the proposed continuum 
demonstrates the subtle differences in the degrees of self-knowledge and highlights why self-
consciousness is the highest degree an animal can exhibit. In what follows I will discuss each 
degree of self-knowledge outlined by Bekoff and Sherman, to establish a concrete definition of 
self-consciousness to be used throughout this project.  
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1.2 The Continuum of Self-Knowledge  
1.2.1 Self-Referencing 
According to Bekoff and Sherman, the first and lowest degree on the continuum of self-
knowledge is self-referencing. Self-referencing refers to a perceptual capacity or recognition 
process in which the discriminating agent (animal) compares phenotypic characteristics of a target 
to itself, the discriminator (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004; Hauber and Sherman, 2001). These 
phenotypic characteristics, also known as labels, include odor or appearance, and are learned by 
the discriminator at a young age (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004 and Hauber and Sherman, 2001). The 
discriminator then uses these labels in order to determine the similarity of the target to itself; if it 
is similar, the target “is recognized and accepted based on the degree of similarity” (Bekoff and 
Sherman, 2004). If it is not similar and not recognized by the discriminator, the target is rejected 
(Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). One of the most common forms of self-referencing in the animal 
kingdom is known as kin recognition (Mateo, 2010). Kin recognition allows for an animal to 
successfully recognize and accept their kin; parents, siblings and half-siblings, by “an internal 
process of assessing genetic relatedness” inferred from its own phenotypic characteristics (Mateo, 
2004). For example, evidence suggests after hibernation, ground squirrels are able to recognize 
and accept their mothers and littermates, “but not previously familiar nonkin” (Mateo, 2010). Thus, 
kin recognition demonstrates the robustness of the capacity for self-referencing; however, it seems, 
that self-referencing “can be reflexive and noncognitive, even occurring in the immune system and 
in creatures without brains” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). As a reflexive and noncognitive 
capacity, which seemingly operates at an unconscious level, self-referencing is the lowest degree 
of self-knowledge, that is not limited to the animal kingdom.  
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1.2.2 Self-Awareness 
 The second degree on the continuum of self-knowledge mapped by Bekoff and Sherman 
is self-awareness, the capacity by which an animal is able to distinguish its own body from the 
bodies of others. Self-awareness is also otherwise referred to as a ‘perceptual consciousness’, 
‘body-ness’ or ‘mine-ness’ (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Bekoff and Sherman claim that this 
degree of self-knowledge is necessary for an animal to successfully exist in a social context with 
others, “to find mates, to evade predators, or to avoid bumping into each other” (Bekoff and 
Sherman, 2004). This is the degree of self-knowledge most of us would automatically attribute to 
our house pets. For example, it certainly seems that a dog has a sense of mine-ness when he is 
protective of his bone or his territory when he relentlessly barks at the neighbor’s dog walking by. 
In addition to the distinctive notion of ‘body-ness’ or ‘mine-ness’ that characterizes self-
awareness, Bekoff and Sherman argue this degree of self-knowledge is dependent on the existence 
of a brain (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Their argument, here, is that the discrimination of 
possessions as ‘mine’ which occurs in self-awareness, either consciously or unconsciously, 
requires a perceptual and integrative processor. This perceptual and integrative processor, thereby, 
must be the brain, which integrates and mediates inputs and outputs. Still, this is not the highest 
degree on the continuum of self-knowledge, nor the degree with which this project concerns itself 
with.  
 
1.2.3 Self-Consciousness  
 According to Bekoff and Sherman, self-consciousness is the highest degree of self-
knowledge observed in the animal kingdom. They find the term self-consciousness synonymous 
with ‘reflective consciousness,’ ‘I-ness’ and the ‘I-self’ (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Further, 
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Bekoff and Sherman define self-consciousness as the sense of a named self to which one’s own 
body belongs (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). That is, “knowing that ‘this body is me’ and thinking 
about one’s self and one’s own behavior in relation to the actions of others” (Bekoff and Sherman, 
2004). Therefore, self-consciousness differs from self-referencing and self-awareness because the 
product or effect of the phenomenon is an animal’s understanding of its own self. Other 
philosophers have defined self-consciousness in a similar way, as the “awareness of one’s self 
narrative” (Andrews, 70), as “consciousness of one’s existence as a continuous agent who moves 
through the world in time” (Andrews, 70), or as “an awareness of (some of) one’s own mental 
states such as feelings, desires and beliefs” (DeGrazia, 2009). Taken together, it seems that the 
phenomenon of self-consciousness not only requires that an animal has mental states, but also the 
awareness of those mental states (DeGrazia, 2009).   
Bekoff and Sherman provide an outline of both the requirements for and effects of self-
consciousness, on animal cognition more generally. The outline of those requirements is the 
following:  
A brain is required, and the underlying processes are conscious… We hypothesize 
that self-consciousness evolves when individuals benefit from analyzing and 
revising their own behavior in light of how specific members of their social group 
responded to their behavior in the past. Self-consciousness leads to dynamic and 
finely graded behavioral outputs” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004).  
Although this conception of self-consciousness is well conceived, it lacks a means for self-
consciousness to be operationalized. One oft-recognized attempt at quantifying self-consciousness 
was proposed by psychologist Gordon G. Gallup, about thirty years ago (Bekoff and Sherman, 
2004). He developed the mirror test for self-recognition, but recently philosophers and scientists 
alike have criticized inferences made by the test (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). In what follows I 
will discuss the mirror test proposed by Gallup and its shortcomings. I will then discuss the 
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foundational aspects of self-consciousness found in Bekoff and Sherman’s outline seen above and 
demonstrate how my proposal of the three conditions for animal self-consciousness thereby arise. 
 
1.3 The Mirror Test and its Shortcomings in Quantifying Self-Consciousness  
 1.3.1 The Mirror Test  
 Gallup’s proposal for the mirror test stems from the idea that if an animal is able to 
recognize itself in a mirror, then it must be the case that is it self-conscious. Here, Gallup differs 
slightly from Bekoff and Sherman’s definition of self-consciousness. Gallup’s notion is based on 
the belief that self-recognition is an indicator for self-consciousness, such that it “requires the 
individual to become the object of [their] own attention, and that involves a concept of self” 
(Andrews, 71) where “a concept of self entails being able to introspect” (Gallup, 1998). To assess 
the validity of this idea, Gallup designed the mirror test as a measurement for the capacity of self-
consciousness through the observation of self-recognition. In the mirror test, the animal of interest 
is marked with a symbol above one eye and the top half of the opposite ear (Gallup, 1998). A 
mirror is then introduced into the animal’s environment; the animal is said to demonstrate self-
recognition, and therefore be self-conscious, if it is able to identify the mark as an affliction of the 
self by touching it on their own face, rather than in the reflected image in the mirror (Gallup, 1998). 
The first successful response to the mirror test was observed in chimpanzees, who were 
anesthetized and marked with a nonodorous and nonirritating red dye (Gallup, 1998). Prior to the 
introduction of the mirror in their environment the chimpanzees did not seem to be aware of the 
mark, but when the mirror was introduced they “guided their fingers to the marks on their faces… 
[and after] touching the marks repeatedly and looking at their fingers, some even smelled their 
fingers” (Gallup, 1998). Thus, chimpanzees were believed to demonstrate self-recognition and it 
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was inferred that they are self-conscious. Following this first success, the mirror test became the 
paradigmatic method of determining which animals are self-conscious (Bekoff and Sherman, 
2004).  
 
1.3.2 The Shortcomings of the Mirror Test  
 However, recently philosophers and scientists alike have highlighted methodological 
issues with the mirror test (Andrews, 70; Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). They criticize the methods 
of interpreting results, such that “it can yield false negatives: if an individual fails the test, it does 
not necessarily mean that the animal is not self-conscious” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). A number 
of circumstances can be cited in support of this criticism: if the animal’s primary sensory modality 
is a sense other than vision, if the animal exhibits a different behavioral response during self-
recognition and if the animal does not look in the mirror to avoid eye contact (Bekoff and Sherman, 
2004). Under these circumstances the animal may fail the mirror test, but ought not be dismissed 
as lacking self-consciousness. For example, according to the mirror test’s standards, bottlenose 
dolphins fail the self-recognition task. Yet dolphins do not have hands with which they can touch 
the mark. Thus, some have pointed out that dolphins might demonstrate self-recognition through 
a different behavioral response. Indeed, “dolphins were observed to spend more time in front of 
the mirror when they had a mark on that side, and would wiggle to position their body so that they 
could see the mark” (Andrews, 71). Similarly, for gorillas making eye contact is an aversive 
behavior, so they might not look into the mirror directly and might not notice the mark. Given 
these examples, it seems that failing the mirror test cannot be treated as evidence that an animal is 
not self-conscious. Therefore, another means of determining whether an animal is self-conscious 
is required.  
 Bernewitz 18 
1.4 Conclusion and Foundation of New Proposal for Determining Self-Consciousness  
 In this project I aim to overcome the shortcomings of the mirror test and propose a new set 
of criteria to determine which animals exhibit the highest degree of self-knowledge, namely self-
consciousness. To establish the foundational aspects of this new theory I return to the definition 
of self-consciousness provided by Bekoff and Sherman. According to Bekoff and Sherman, self-
consciousness is an animal’s sense of having a self to which their own body belongs (Bekoff and 
Sherman, 2004). Further, self-consciousness requires a brain, benefits the animal in their reflection 
of experiences in the social context and allows for dynamic and finely graded outputs (Bekoff and 
Sherman, 2004). These are the foundational aspects from which my proposal arises; that self-
consciousness is dependent on the simultaneous occurrence of three conditions: (1) a complex 
nervous system, (2) communication, and (3) collaborative social play. Insofar, I believe these three 
conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient for animal self-consciousness. The first condition is 
based in Bekoff and Sherman’s claim that the phenomenon requires a brain. I aim to elaborate on 
this and establish at which stage in evolution of the nervous system it is adequately complex for 
the emergence of self-consciousness. The second condition is based in the notion that 
communication, specifically intentional communication, is seminal for the emergence of self-
consciousness. Finally, the third condition is based in the idea that collaborative social play, is the 
result of dynamic and finely grained outputs resulting in self-consciousness. Throughout the next 
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CHAPTER 2 
In this chapter, I explore the first condition proposed for animal self-consciousness, namely 
a complex nervous system. I begin with an evolutionary discussion of the nervous system more 
generally, and address what I mean when I refer to complexity. Indeed, the notion of complexity I 
employ here refers to a functional organization between neurons. I go on to identify three stages 
in the evolution of the nervous system, each of which can be understood as increasing levels of 
complexity. The first stage in the evolution of the nervous system I identify is widespread signal 
transmission which occurs in nerve nets, the second is signal boosting and the third is centralized 
attention. Through the consideration of each stage, I find that for self-consciousness the nervous 
system process signals in a meaningful way. Using Giorgio Marchetti’s understanding of the 
relationship between meaning and the self, I demonstrate that self-consciousness is dependent on 
meaning. I find that it is only the third stage in the evolution of the nervous system, centralized 
attention, which is adequately complex to process signals in a meaningful way. Thus, any animal 
whose nervous system has the capacity for centralized attention, meets the first necessary condition 
set forth for animal self-consciousness.  
 
2.1 Neurons: The Building Blocks of the Nervous System  
Neurons are the cellular building blocks of the nervous system. They comprise the majority 
of the system, and themselves possess an unusual shape allowing for specialized cell-to-cell 
signaling (Graziano, 9 and Godfrey-Smith, 22-23). A neuron consists of four microdomains; a cell 
body or soma with multiple branches called dendrites, as well as a long protrusion or axon ending 
at its terminal. This shape results in the possibility of creating an elaborate maze of connections 
between the terminal of one neuron and the dendrites of other neurons (Godfrey-Smith, 22). When 
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one neuron becomes electrically excited, an action potential is propagated along the axon at a rate 
of two-hundred feet per second (Graziano, 9). Here, the action potential can be thought of as a 
“wave of electrochemical energy [that] sweeps across the membrane of the cell from one end to 
the other” (Graziano, 9). Following the arrival of the action potential at the terminal, the neuron 
releases a small amount of neurotransmitter across the synaptic cleft between the terminal of the 
releasing neuron and the dendrite of the receiving neuron. The neurotransmitter then binds to 
receptors on the receiving neuron and either triggers or suppresses a subsequent action potential 
in that neuron (Godfrey-Smith, 23). This, in short, is how neurons transmit signals to one another. 
However, cell-to-cell signaling via action potentials is not tied to the appearance of neurons; action 
potentials “existed in cells before animals evolved and exist today outside of them” (Godfrey-
Smith, 23). Similarly, cell-to-cell signaling itself is commonly observed in the biological realm 
outside of the animal kingdom. Thus, one might wonder, what is unique about the cell-to-cell 
signaling that occurs between neurons?  
There are two principles which are most commonly cited for the particular quality of the 
cell-to-cell signaling that occurs between neurons (Godfrey-Smith, 23). First, signal transmission 
in between neurons is incredibly fast. As stated before, an action potential travels along the axon 
of a single neuron at a rate of two-hundred feet per second. This means that the influences of one 
neuron on another can occur seemingly instantaneously. For example, consider what happens 
when one accidently steps on a dog’s paws when hectically moving around. One observes a reflex 
in which the dog pulls away his paw almost immediately: sensory neurons in the paw send 
information from the paw to the spinal cord, and motor neurons in the spinal cord send information 
back to the paw in a matter of milliseconds. This illustrates that the speed at which neurons are 
able to transmit signals allows for an animal to seamlessly interact with its environment. Second, 
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signal transmission between neurons is targeted. For example, neurons are able to act upon specific 
cells involved in the desired output. Indeed, some neurons release or respond only to a select 
number of neurotransmitters, while others have extended axons that “reach some distance through 
the brain or body and affect just a few distant cells” (Godfrey-Smith, 23). Similarly, neurons are 
able to respond to specific signals involved in the desired input, as demonstrated in the visual 
cortex where neurons selectively respond to lines of light at various orientations. In accordance 
with the principles of fast and targeted signaling, neurons set the stage for a demarcation in which 
cell-to-cell signaling is transformed from “an activity in which cells simply broadcast their signals 
to whoever is close enough and listening into something different: an organized network” 
(Godfrey-Smith, 23). The emergence of this organized network can be thought of as the appearance 
of the nervous system in the animal kingdom.  
 
2.2 The Appearance of the Nervous System in the Animal Kingdom  
The appearance of the nervous system in the animal kingdom seems to correspond with the 
advent of multicellular organisms, occurring between 600 and 700 million years ago (Graziano, 
8). Indeed, sea sponges, the earliest of all multicellular animals to arise about 700 million years 
ago, share 25 of the genes involved in the development of the nervous system in humans today 
(Sakarya et al., 2007). However, in lacking a specified body plan, sea sponges show no evidence 
of an actualized nervous system, thus placing them at its “evolutionary threshold” (Graziano, 9). 
Genetic analyses from sea jellies point towards the arrival of the first actualized nervous system a 
mere 50 million years later (Erwin et al., 2004). One might conceive of sea jellies as “something 
soft, with no shell or skeleton, probably hovering in the water… a filmy lightbulb in which the 
rhythms of nervous activity first began” (Godfrey-Smith, 27). This suggests that an organized 
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network of neurons, and as such the nervous system, first appeared in the animal kingdom between 
the arrival of sea sponges and sea jellies, some 650 to 700 million years ago (Graziano, 9). 
However, the beginnings of a nervous system described in sea jellies is not nearly as complex as 
those which have evolved and are observed later, with the arrival of mammals, cephalopods and 
reptiles.  
 
2.3 The Levels of Complexity in the Evolution of the Nervous System  
 Below I outline three stages in the evolution of the nervous system, which ought to be 
understood as stages of increasing levels of complexity within the nervous system itself. Recall 
that in this chapter I aim to establish at which stage in the evolution of the nervous system, it is 
adequately complex for animal self-consciousness. Prior to the investigation of those stages, there 
are two aspects to my argument which must be clarified; the first being what I mean when I refer 
to a level of complexity and second being why I choose to highlight the following three stages in 
the evolution of the nervous system in particular. First, the term “complexity” points to a number 
of different possible interpretations, such as the level of organization, the connectivity between 
parts, or the sophistication of function. Each of these interpretations would impact my argument, 
that a particular level of complexity of the nervous system is required for self-consciousness, in a 
different way. For the purpose of this chapter and project more generally, the interpretation of 
complexity I employ is level of organization. Specifically, the level of organization between 
neurons, where a nervous system with a high level of complexity demonstrates a high level of 
organization between neurons. I believe this is a functional organization, without which there is 
merely chaos, such that it exists for the purpose of doing something (more on what that something 
is later, hint: to process signals in a meaningful way). Thus, in this project, complexity does not 
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imply more connections. In fact, evidence from the development of the human nervous system, 
indicates that organization results from an important process of pruning, in which unused 
connections between neurons are lost. 
 The second aspect of my argument which must be clarified is that the three stages in the 
evolution of the nervous system highlighted below seem to have evolved in a particular order, such 
that each level of complexity follows from the other. Further, these stages are important to the 
emergence of animal self-consciousness in particular. Here, it is important to make clear that the 
evolutionary history of the nervous system can be mapped in a number of different ways. That is, 
the interpretation of which moments in the evolution of the nervous system are important is 
significantly informed by the investigator’s perspective. For example, one perspective might focus 
on the nervous system’s structural evolution through the consideration of changes in 
neuroanatomy, while another perspective might focus on its functional evolution through the 
consideration of changes in the biological processes. Thus, depending on the investigator’s 
perspective, the moments mapped in the evolutionary history might vary, although underlying 
phylogenetic relationships of those moments, which are independent of the investigator, do not. In 
addition to the investigator’s perspective, the focal point of the project also informs the 
interpretation of which moments in the evolution of the nervous system are important. In this 
project, dependent on my perspective, the three stages in the evolution of the nervous system which 
I highlight, reflect its functional evolution, as each stage is understood as an increasing level of 
complexity. Recall, that increased levels of complexity are characterized by increased levels of 
organization between neurons. Moreover, dependent on the focal point of this project, in which I 
aim to establish a new set of conditions for animal self-consciousness, the three stages highlighted 
in what follows are those which are integral leading up to the emergence of self-consciousness.   
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2.3.1 The First Stage in the Evolution of the Nervous System 
 The first stage or level of complexity I identify in the evolution of the nervous system is 
widespread signal transmission which occurs in nerve nets (Graziano, 9). Nerve nets are commonly 
understood as networks of neurons forming mesh-like structures that span across the body of an 
animal and form connections between the animal’s muscles (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015; Graziano, 
9). These mesh-like structures lend themselves to a number of unique qualities in relation to the 
functional aspects of widespread signal transmission, which characterize this first stage in the 
evolution of the nervous system. The first of these qualities is that signal transmission occurs in 
any direction across the nerve net itself (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015). By allowing for signal 
transmission to occur in any direction, nerve nets overcome the potential limitations of a simple 
organization, and as such are “sufficient to form the integrative part between reception of the 
environment of an organism and its ability to react to changes in these environmental cues” (Hejnol 
and Rentzsch, 2015). Thus, the widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets provide the 
animal with the capacity to receive and respond to cues from their environment. Another unique 
quality of the widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets is that signal transmission 
occurs indiscriminately. This means that signals, both sensory input and motor output, spread 
throughout the whole nerve net, and as such the whole body of the animal. One oft-cited example 
of this occurs in the hydra, a small water animal similar to sea jellies. If the hydra is prodded at 
one point in its body (sensory input), the whole hydra twitches in response (motor output) 
(Graziano, 9). Thus, this widespread signal transmission in nerve nets highlight a relatively equal 
distribution of neurons throughout the entirety of the animal tissue at this stage in the evolution of 
the nervous system (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015). However, this widespread transmission is only 
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possible because, in the strict sense, nerve nets do not have “any ganglion-like accumulations of 
nerve cells or bundles of neurites” (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015). 
 
2.3.2 The Second Stage in the Evolution of the Nervous System 
 The second stage or level of complexity in the evolution of the nervous system quickly 
follows from mere signal transmission, as seen in nerve nets, to signal boosting (Graziano, 10). 
Signal boosting or enhancing is “the ability to enhance some signals over others… [and] is one of 
the most basic ways neurons manipulate information” (Graziano, 10). At the cellular level of the 
nervous system, this occurs via a process known as lateral inhibition, in which a signal is enhanced 
as a “consequence of neurons inhibiting their neighbors” (Graziano, 10). One of the most 
prominent examples of this principle in the animal kingdom is observed in the crab’s compound 
eye, which contains clusters of light detectors (Graziano, 10). Those light detectors each contain a 
neuron that is connected to the neurons of neighboring detectors within the cluster, such that when 
light hits the crab’s eye:   
A neuron in one detector becomes active, [and] it tends to suppress the activity of 
the other neurons in the neighboring detectors, like a person in a crowd who is 
trying to shout the loudest while shushing the people nearest to him… The pattern 
of activity across the set of detectors in the eye not only signals a bright spot, but 
also signals a ring of darkness around it. The signal is, in this way, enhanced 
(Graziano, 10).  
The example of lateral inhibition in the crab’s eye, however, is only one instance of the basic 
principle of signal boosting that occurs in the nervous system. Indeed, signal boosting seems to 
occur at multiple levels of signal processing, “from the eye to the highest levels of thought in the 
cerebral cortex” (Graziano, 11).  
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2.3.3 The Third Stage in the Evolution of the Nervous System  
 Meanwhile, the third stage or level of complexity I identify in the evolution of the nervous 
system in the animal kingdom is centralized attention (Graziano, 11). Centralized attention allows 
for multimodal signal integration; the pooling and sorting of information from a number of sensory 
inputs, such as vision, olfaction and touch (Graziano, 12). In turn, multimodal signal integration 
allows for the animal to exhibit a “coordination between parts… [for] the task of generating 
coherent whole-organism actions” (Godfrey-Smith, 23-24). So, centralized attention as 
multimodal signal integration allows for the animal to identify and respond to the most important 
signal in its current environment. As such, it allows for a “meaningful response” (Graziano, 12). 
However, for this to be observed in an animal, there must be one place in the nervous system where 
the convergence of signals occurs. Therefore, it is proposed that this stage in the evolution of the 
nervous system requires a central attention processor (Graziano, 12). Such a processor is most 
often conceived of as a central brain or an “aggregate of neurons [or ganglion] in the head that is 
larger than any of the others in the body” (Graziano, 12). Given these hypotheses, one can infer 
that centralized attention is likely displayed by most vertebrates who have a central brain similar 
to our own, as well as arthropods including crabs, insects and spiders, who have a central ganglion 
located in their head. Furthermore, recent studies indicate that certain cephalopods, such as 
octopuses, squid and cuttlefish also have developed a complex central brain, and as such likely 
also display centralized attention (Graziano, 13).  
 
2.4 Levels of Complexity and the Emergence of Self-Consciousness  
Before discussing the complexity in each stage and its relation to the emergence of animal 
self-consciousness, here, it would be helpful to recall the aim of this project more generally. 
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Throughout this project, I aim to establish a new set of conditions to determine which animals are 
and are not self-consciousness. That is, which animals exhibit an understanding of their own self, 
such that they have mental states along with an awareness of those mental states (DeGrazia, 2009). 
In the previous chapter, I established three conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient 
for animal self-consciousness. Those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication, 
and (3) collaborative behavior, such that animal self-consciousness is dependent on the 
simultaneous occurrence of all three conditions. In this chapter I explore the evolution of the 
necessary complexity of the nervous system, as the first of those conditions. As argued in the 
previous chapter, this condition is informed by Bekoff and Sherman’s definition of self-
consciousness, one aspect of which is its dependent on the presence of a brain or brain-like 
structure (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). If one were to consider the three stages discussed above, 
solely in regard the presence of a brain or brain-like structure, there would be a straightforward 
answer concerning which stages meet this standard for the first and third stages, but not the second.  
The first stage, widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets, would fail because 
in the strict sense nerve nets have no brain or brain-like structure (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015). 
The third stage, centralized attention, would meet the standard because it depends on a central 
attention processor, namely a brain (Graziano, 12). However, the second stage would fall 
somewhere in between failing and meeting the standard, because signal boosting can occur both 
in a non-brain structure (as in an eye), as well as in a brain (as a part of higher levels of thought 
meditated in the cerebral cortex) (Graziano, 11). The notion that the second stage would fall 
somewhere in between points to why, in this chapter, I elaborate on a necessary level of 
complexity. By turning to complexity, I overcome the limitations of considering the presence of a 
brain alone and address an aspect of the nervous system that seems crucial for the emergence of 
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self-consciousness. This aspect is the difference between nervous systems which merely transmit 
signals and nervous systems which process signals in a meaningful way, so that they are 
“consciously experienced” (Vitti, 2010). Thus, for an animal to meet the first condition, its nervous 
system must demonstrate an adequate level of complexity to process signals in a meaningful way. 
 
2.4.1 Meaningful Processing and What it has to do with Self-Consciousness  
As addressed above, for an animal to meet the first condition set forth for self-
consciousness, its nervous system must be adequately complex to process signals in a meaningful 
way. In this way self-consciousness is dependent on meaning. But then, one might wonder: what 
is the sense of meaning employed here? Here, I follow a tradition in philosophy of mind, in which 
I employ the semantic theory of meaning. The semantic theory of meaning concerns itself with 
assigning semantic content to a symbol or expression. It is “a specification of the meanings of the 
words and sentences of some symbol system” (“Theories of Meaning,” 2010). Within the sematic 
theory, there are two aspects of a word which together is its meaning. The first component is that 
the word picks out a thing in the world, its reference, while the second component is that the word 
beings about concepts or ideas about a thing in the world, its sense (Frege, 1952). However, the 
concepts or ideas also point towards a thing in the world, such that there is a relationship between 
a mental state and a thing in the world. This relationship is commonly referred to as mental 
representation (“Theories of Meaning,” 2010). Thereby, the semantic theory indicates that to 
process signals in a meaningful way has something to do with mental representation, which allows 
for a thing in the world to be significant to the individual.  
Philosopher Giorgio Marchetti claims that when an animal has the capacity to process 
signals in a meaningful way, the animal who “consciously experiences it, knows, what it means to 
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him” (Marchetti, 2017). So, Marchetti finds that meaning provides the animal with three aspects 
of information about his conscious experience: 
(1) That his experience has a content [a phenomenal quality of “what it is like”], 
and what the content is… (2) that the experience he is having differs from other 
kinds of experiences that he already had or could potentially have… and (3) that 
the experience he is having is his own, that is, it belongs to him and no one else 
(Marchetti, 2017).  
According to Marchetti, these three aspects of information about the animal’s conscious 
experience always already contains within itself a reference to the existence of a self (Marchetti, 
2017). This self is represented in the nervous system and acts as the mechanism through which the 
animal is reduced to a single entity. Moreover, this self “supplies the system with the sense of 
being a unique, single entity, which evolutionarily culminates in the appearance of self-
consciousness” (Marchetti, 2017). I use Marchetti’s work to explicate the relationship between 
meaning and self-consciousness, however, I differ in my understanding of the direction of 
dependence. Marchetti claims that meaning is dependent on self-consciousness, while I claim that 
self-consciousness is dependent on meaning, such that the direction of dependence is reversed.  
 
2.4.2 Meaningful Processing in Centralized Attention 
As seen above, meaning and self-consciousness are intricately interwoven, such that self-
consciousness is dependent on meaning. Recall too that meaning stems from the adequate 
complexity of the nervous system, defined as a functional organization between neurons. In 
returning to the discussion about which of the three stages in the evolution of the nervous system 
is adequately complex to meet the first condition for self-consciousness, and in employing the 
notion of meaning, it is once again immediately apparent that the first stage fails to be adequately 
complex. The characteristic widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets, is not 
adequately complex to process signals in a meaningful way. Indeed, as established earlier, a unique 
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quality of nerve nets is the indiscriminate transmission of signals. The term “indiscriminate” refers 
to a process of doing something in a random or unsystematic manner (Merriam-Webster, 2021). 
Indiscriminate transmission exists in direct opposition to complexity, which invokes the notion of 
functional organization. Further, without adequate complexity, it seems nerve nets do not produce 
the kind of meaning upon which self-consciousness is dependent; and that instead, they merely 
transmit signals. Thus, widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets is not adequately 
complex to meet the first condition for self-consciousness.  
Meanwhile, the second stage in the evolution of the nervous system, signal boosting, 
demonstrates increased complexity. Signal boosting demonstrates early levels of complexity or 
functional organization in the nervous system, as it requires neurons to systematically inhibit their 
neighbors to enhance their signals and respond to their environment in a targeted way. But the 
question remains, is signal boosting adequately complex to process signals in a meaningful way, 
as to meet the first condition for self-consciousness? There are several mechanisms which 
seemingly respond to their environment in a targeted way without processing signals in a 
meaningful way. For example, a thermostat receives information (or signals) about the temperature 
of the room and responds by adjusting the amount of hot or cold air that is blown into that room. 
However, it is fair to assume that the thermostat is not processing signals in a meaningful way, nor 
conscious of them. It seems, then, that a system which is adequately complex to respond to the 
environment in a targeted way, does not necessarily demonstrate adequate complexity to process 
signals in a meaningful way. Thus, signal booting, also does not produce meaning upon which 
self-consciousness is dependent and is not adequately complex to meet the first condition for self-
consciousness. Nonetheless, it can be thought of as an integral stage in the evolution of the nervous 
system leading up to the complexity required for self-consciousness.  
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The third stage in the evolution of the nervous system, centralized attention, however, does 
demonstrate adequate complexity to process signals in a meaningful way. Centralized attention by 
definition is a result of the multimodal integration of inputs in a highly complex, or functionally 
organized system. Further, it allows for the animal to identify and respond to the most important 
signal in its current environment, and as such for the animal to have a “meaningful response,” 
(Graziano, 12) as to process signals in a meaningful way. Recall that according to Marchetti’s 
work, the relation between meaning and self-consciousness is that meaning already always 
contains within itself a reference to the existence of a self (Marchetti, 2017). Recall also that I use 
Marchetti’s understanding of the relationship between meaning and a sense of self to demonstrate 
that self-consciousness is dependent on meaning. Therefore, as centralized attention is adequately 
complex to process signals in a meaningful way which points to a sense of self, centralized 
attention meets the first condition set forth for self-consciousness.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
In sum, I have demonstrated that centralized attention, the third stage in the evolution of 
the nervous system, is adequately complex to meet the first condition for animal self-
consciousness. In this chapter, I found that complexity of the nervous system is defined by the 
functional organization between neurons; and that a nervous system is only adequately complex 
for self-consciousness if it allows for signals to be processed in a meaningful way. Indeed, using 
Marchetti’s claim that meaning always already contains within itself a reference to the self, I 
argued that self-consciousness is dependent on meaning. I found that both the first and second 
stages in the evolution of the nervous system, widespread signal transmission occurring nerve nets 
and signal boosting, lack the functional organization to process signals in a meaningful way, and 
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so fail to be adequately complex for animal self-consciousness. However, the third stage in the 
evolution of the nervous system, namely centralized attention, demonstrates the functional 
organization required to process signals in a meaningful way. That is, centralized attention 
demonstrates multimodal signal integration in a central attention processor or brain. Thus, I have 
demonstrated that any animal whose nervous system has the capacity for centralized attention, 
meets the first necessary condition set forth for animal self-consciousness, that being a complex 

















 Bernewitz 33 
CHAPTER 3 
 I have argued, so far, for three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for self-
consciousness in animals. Those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication and (3) 
collaborative social play. In this chapter I explore the second condition. I begin with a brief 
overview of the suggestion that animal communication can be used as evidence of thinking, as the 
motivation for what follows in this chapter. I go on to consider three accounts of what 
communication consists in, in order to establish an account which points to the emergence of self-
consciousness. The first account of communication I consider is the biological account, which I 
criticize on the basis that it is too permissive, and as such does not point to a sense of self. The 
second account is information-based, which I criticize on the basis that it is silent on the nature 
and content of animal minds. Here, it is helpful to note that an account’s indication of the nature 
and content of animal minds is necessary for this project, which seeks to determine which animals 
have a sense of self, that is, which animals are self-conscious. Next, I consider a third account, 
known as the intentional account, which is largely concerned with the intention of a 
communicative utterance. The intentional account provides a significant body of literature relevant 
to how animals communicate their thoughts. With a focus on the Gricean approach to intentional 
accounts of animal communication, I will use Juan Gómez’s interpretation to demonstrate that 
intentional communication is formative of a sense of self, and as such self-consciousness. Thus, 
any animal whose communicative utterance fits the intentional account, meets the second 
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3.1 Why Animal Communication?  
Philosopher Donald R. Griffin proposes that animal communication might be able to 
provide a number of insights about the nature and content of animal minds (Griffin, 154). He states 
that the mechanisms underlying animal communication exist as “a source of objective evidence 
about the thoughts and feelings [of animals] that have previously seemed so inaccessible” (Griffin, 
154). The basis of Griffin’s claim is that if animals have subjective thoughts and feelings, these 
would likely be reflected in their communicative utterances (Griffin, 154). That is, if animals have 
thoughts and feelings, one might assume it would be in their best interest to be able to share those 
with others, as well as for the others to correctly understand them (Griffin, 154). So, it seems 
animal communication can be evaluated as an exchange of thoughts and feeling between animals, 
and the probability that this exchange might alter the nature or content of their minds. Given 
Griffin’s claims, in this chapter I explore communication as the second condition required for 
animal self-consciousness. I use Griffin’s notion that communication reflects the nature and 
content of animal minds, such that if this includes a sense of self, the communicative utterance of 
the animal meets the second condition for self-consciousness.   
 
3.2 What is Animal Communication? 
When one turns to a discussion of what animal communication is, one can observe multiple 
paradigmatic instances of communication, and extract from them a general definition which points 
to what they have in common. To start with, social insects communicate; honeybees are famous 
for their waggle dance, which is used to indicate to other bees in the hive the exact location of 
pollinating flowers (Von Frisch, 1967). Similarly, fish communicate. For example, electric fish 
use electrical signals in both social and predator-prey interactions (Griffin, 154). Birds also 
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communicate in a number of ways; chickens use a number of distinct calls and ravens “gesture 
with their beaks and use eye contact to coordinate interactions with nonfood items such as twigs 
or moss” (Andrews, 111). Finally, mammals communicate too. For example, baboons demonstrate 
at least 14 distinct audible expressions with different meanings, while both prairie dogs and 
meerkats also demonstrate “distinct alarm calls to warn group members about the appearance of 
various predators” (Andrews, 111).  
Philosopher Kristin Andrews claims that each of these instances highlight a shared aspect 
of animal communication, namely that it involves the coordination of two or more animals 
(Andrews, 111). However, Andrews also claims that, taken together, they point to another set of 
questions about animal communication; “What else do they have in common? And how do they 
differ? Are they all instances of the same kind of communication?” (Andrews, 111). In order to 
answer these questions, one must establish an account of animal communication from which to 
proceed. According to Andrews, there are three prominent accounts of communication, the 
biological, the information-based and the intentional, each of which demonstrate a slightly 
different understanding of animal communication, and which communicative utterances ought to 
be encompassed in that conception. In what follows, I investigate those accounts in order to 
articulate an account of animal communication that illuminates the nature and content of animal 
minds. For the purpose of this project, I must establish an account of communication which 
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3.3 Accounts of Animal Communication  
3.3.1 Biological Accounts 
One account of animal communication is biological, in which communication is generally 
thought of as “a relationship between two organisms such that a change in the state of one organism 
causes a change in the state of the other organism” (Andrews, 112). Indeed, biologist Peter James 
Slater claims that the very essence of communication is that the behavior of one animal influences 
another’s behavior (Gómez, 62). However, this unrestricted account of communication lends itself 
to being too permissive (Gómez, 62). For example, if animal A kicks animal B, and animal B’s 
behavior changes in response to the kick, according to Slater’s account, this interaction would be 
thought of as communicative. In order to avoid being too permissive, other biologists propose 
accounts of communication which adopt additional criteria to that criterion of “influencing another 
animal’s behavior” (Gomez, 62). For example, Richard Dawkins and John Krebs find that the 
essence of communication is dependent on two criteria; (1) that the communicative behavior of 
one animal results in a change of behavior or attitude in another animal, and (2) that this change 
benefits the animal who originally exhibited the communicative behavior (Andrews, 112).  
Nonetheless, even with the adoption of the additional criteria, biological accounts provide 
minimal constraints on which behaviors or interactions are communicative. As a result, these 
minimal constraints allow for simple behaviors to be determined to be communicative (Andrews, 
112). For example, according to these accounts even a number of behaviors or interactions outside 
of the animal kingdom would be communicative. Bean plants release an odorous substance which 
attracts wasps, who in turn feed on small bugs that are infesting the plant (Andrews, 112). Further, 
bean plants also send signals through their roots to neighboring plants, warning them of their 
infestation, so that those plants can proactively release the sustenance (Andrews, 113). Thus, 
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according to biological accounts the bean plants are communicating; the change in behavior of one 
influences another. In addition to the minimal constraints provided by biological accounts which 
“make the answer to the communication question too simple,” (Andrews, 113) these accounts also 
provide nothing to the discussion of the nature and content of animal minds. That is, they make no 
claims in regard to the notion “whether animals can communicate their thoughts,” (Andrews, 113) 
and as such cannot be used in the determination of which animals have a sense of self, as to be 
self-conscious.   
 
3.3.2 Information Based Accounts  
 Another account of animal communication is information-based, where alternatively, 
communication is thought of as “the exchange of information from one party to another” 
(Andrews, 113). The information-based accounts of communication, first proposed by 
mathematician Claude Shannon, claim that the message sent by one animal is simply an encoded 
signal of information, which is decoded and reconstructed by another animal (Andrews, 113). 
However, it is important to clarify that not every signal sent by an animal contains information, 
such that information is defined as “a means of reducing uncertainty in the receiver” (Andrews, 
113). That is, signals containing information must provide a representation of content which alters 
the other’s perception and/or actions. Ruth Millikan refers to the simplest form of information 
exchange as pushmi-pullyu representations (Millikan, 2006). In pushmi-pullyu representations, the 
signal sent by an animal “simultaneously gives information about the situation and information 
about how to respond to the situation” (Andrews, 114). For example, in the waggle dance, 
honeybees depend on the specificity of movements in their dance to send information to other bees 
in the hive the exact location of pollinating flowers, whose pollen is needed for the production of 
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honey (Von Frisch, 1967). However, this is the same principle upon which computer systems 
work. Given that “information-based accounts can include natural as well as artificial design; 
artifacts and artificial systems such as computer networks can communicate as well” (Andrews, 
114). Thus, just like the biological account, the information-based account of animal 
communication provides no insight into the nature and content of animal minds and cannot be used 
in the investigation of animal self-consciousness.  
 
3.3.3 Intentional Accounts 
Meanwhile, a third account of animal communication is intentional, in which 
communication is “flexible, and requires expecting that another receives the message” (Andrews, 
115). That is, according to this account, the communicative utterance of the animal is “intended to 
have a communicative effect” (Gómez, 64). Here, intention is used in the sense that when the 
animal sends a signal containing information, the animal is aware both of that information and the 
effect sharing that information will have; “indeed this is why he or she uses the signal” (Gómez, 
64). When distinguishing intentional from unintentional communication, it seems intentional 
communication must always be partially referential and not simply emotive (Andrews, 123). 
Biologist Peter Marler suggests that functionally referential utterances are those in which, “(1) the 
production of the signal must be caused by the same kind of stimuli, and (2) hearing or seeing the 
signal must cause the same effect as does hearing or seeing the object the signal refers to” 
(Andrews, 124). For example, bantam chickens give two distinct alarm calls, one for aerial 
predators and another for ground predators (Andrews, 124). Similarly, they exhibit two distinct 
escape actions, one for aerial predators such as hawks, and another for ground predators such as 
foxes. Yet, bantam chickens demonstrate the same escape action in response to a hawk, regardless 
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of whether they saw the hawk themselves or if another chicken gave the aerial predator alarm call 
(Andrews, 124).  
Referential utterances, however, are not limited to alarm calls; in some cases, food calls, 
social calls and contact calls meet Marler’s criteria as well. Contact calls, specifically, are 
referential as they are representative of a particular individual (Andrews, 124). For example, 
bottlenose dolphins “develop individually distinctive signature whistles that they use to maintain 
group cohesion… [such that] signature whistles can facilitate continued contact between 
individuals” (Janik et al., 2016). Dolphins within the pod learn to identify the signature whistle 
and recognize it as representing that particular individual (Andrews, 125). Interestingly, dolphins 
develop their signature whistle within the first few months of their lives, and while female dolphins 
maintain a stable signature whistle, it seems males are able to modify theirs (Tyack, 1997; 
Andrews, 125). Moreover, dolphins seem to have an incredible capacity for imitation, such that 
they sometimes imitate another dolphin’s signature whistle to gain a response from the named 
individual (Tyack, 1997; Andrews, 125). These features of the bottlenose dolphin signature 
whistles point to referential properties, which are central to intentional accounts of animal 
communication. Further, they indicate that intentional communication does, indeed, have 
something to say about the nature and content of animal minds, and as such about the thoughts and 
feelings of animals. Thus, the intentional account is an articulation of communication which can 
be used in the investigation of which communicative utterances of an animal meet the second 
condition set forth for self-consciousness. I elaborate on intentional accounts of animal 
communication in what follows and aim to demonstrate how it is that intentional communication 
results in a sense of self and meets the second condition for self-consciousness.  
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3.4 Intentional Accounts: The Gricean Approach 
Different approaches have been taken in the discussion of intentional communication, the 
most influential of which is the Gricean approach. The Gricean approach stems from philosopher 
H.P. Grice’s suggestion that when animals intentionally communicate with one another, they think 
about what the other is thinking (Andrews, 115 and Gómez, 64). For example, if animal A 
communicates X to animal B, animal A intends X to provoke a reaction in animal B, because 
animal A believes animal B will understand X. Indeed, this brief example demonstrates the 
Gricean approach to intentional communication, in which the signal of one animal is intended to 
produce a response in another animal, such that the other animal recognizes the intention of the 
signal, and this recognition of intention accounts for the other animal’s response to the signal 
(Andrews, 115). Thus, the Gricean approach seems to depend on a sophisticated theory of mind 
(TOM) (Andrews, 115). Indeed, philosopher Daniel Dennett claims that the Gricean approach to 
intentional accounts of animal communication requires the animal to have a third-order intentional 
system (Andrews, 116).  
This stems from Dennett’s discussion of the different orders of intentional systems and the 
way in which they ought to be conceived of, where: 
A first-order intentional system has beliefs and desires (etc.) but no beliefs and 
desires about beliefs and desires. Thus, all the attributions we make to a merely 
first-order intentional system have the logical form of  
7. x believes that p  
8. y wants that q  
where "p" and "q" are clauses that themselves contain no intentional idioms.  
A second-order intentional system is more sophisticated; it has beliefs and desires 
(and no doubt other intentional states) about beliefs and desires (and other 
intentional states) - both those of others and its own. For instance  
9. x wants y to believe that x is hungry  
10. x believes y expects x to jump left  
11. x fears that y will discover that x has a food cache  
A third-order intentional system is one that is capable of such states as  
12. x wants y to believe that x believes he is all alone. (Dennett, 1983) 
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To summarize Dennett’s discussion above, a first-order intentional system has beliefs and desires, 
a second-order intentional system has beliefs and desires about those beliefs and desires, while a 
third-order intentional account has beliefs and desires about the second order beliefs and desires. 
Through the consideration of those conceptions, it becomes evident why, according to Dennett, 
the Gricean approach to communication requires a third-order intentional system. Recall that in 
the Gricean approach when animals intentionally communicate with one another, they think about 
what the other is thinking (Andrews, 115; Gómez, 64). Animals with first-order intentional 
systems have no beliefs about beliefs, and so lack the ability to think about what the other is 
thinking; while animals with second-order intentional systems lack the ability think about their 
desire for the other to think about their intention. So, only animals with third-order intentional 
systems have “the ability to think about the beliefs others have about one’s own beliefs,” 
(Andrews, 116) as to fit the standard of the Gricean approach to intentional communication.   
 
3.5 The Gricean Approach to Intentional Communication and Mutual Awareness in Animals  
One interpretation of the Gricean approach, which follows from the belief that it requires 
a third-order intentional system, is that intentional communication involves mutual awareness, 
occurring between the speaker and the listener (Gómez, 68). It is important to note, that this mutual 
awareness is an awareness of the other’s mental processes, not merely the other’s presence during 
the communicative interaction (Gómez, 68). As such, it is “an awareness of the other’s awareness” 
(Gómez, 68). Gómez claims that this mutual awareness stems from attention contact, which can 
be understood as the mutual recognition of the other’s signs of attention (Gómez, 73-76). 
Accordingly, attention contact consists of animal A attending to the signs of attention of animal 
B, while animal B is attending to the signs of attention of animal A at the same time. Gómez notes 
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this follows a peculiar Gricean structure (Gómez, 72). One compelling way to show attention 
contact is through eye contact, in which one animal attends the other’s eyes, checks their attention 
and becomes aware of the object or being that is the focus of the other’s attention (Gómez, 72). 
However, attention contact is not reducible to eye contact, such that there are other signs of 
attention including mirroring, mimicry, etc. Thus, “insofar as we admit that the signs of attention 
are signs of awareness, they can be said to be aware of each other’s awareness” (Gómez, 76).  
Gómez goes on to state that when two animals are intentionally communicating, they not 
only “think of each other thinking of each other; they perceive each other attending to each other” 
(Gómez, 76). That is, when two animals are in attention contact, they perceive each other’s 
attention rather than merely thinking of each other’s attention; such that the mutual awareness 
which occurs is perceptual, not intellectual (Gómez, 76). This indicates that the attention of one 
animal can be mediated through its perception of the focus of attention of the other. For example, 
chimpanzees are able to discover hidden food through their perception of the focus of attention of 
a leader, who knows where the food is hidden (Gómez, 76). The result of this interpretation is a 
particularly interesting one, such that if the focus of attention of the other is on an animal’s own 
attention, the other’s attention points to an animals’ own attentional activity (Gómez, 76). This is 
what occurs in attention contact, thereby “the structure of attentional contact seems to lead to a 
first version of self-awareness (both as a physical and as an “aware” or “attending” entity)” 
(Gómez, 76). Ultimately, Gómez claims that the Gricean approach to intentional communication, 
which involves attention contact, implies “a sophisticated combination of self- and other-
awareness” (Gómez, 68).  
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3.6 The Gricean Approach to Intentional Communication and Self-Consciousness  
The above claim, that attention contact might allow for the emergence of more complex 
versions of self- and other- awareness, follows the structure of G.H. Mead’s and Vygotsky’s ideas 
(Gómez, 77). The structure of their ideas is that a sense of self is mediated through the other, but 
of course Gómez takes it a step further, that a sense of self is mediated through the awareness of 
the other’s attention (Gómez, 77). That is, “the ability to understand the other’s attention or 
awareness would lead to the ability to understand one’s own awareness” (Gómez, 77). Thus, it is 
through the mutual awareness that occurs in intentional communication, that this mediation of a 
sense of self through the awareness of the other arises. Recall that this mutual awareness stems 
from attention contact, (Gómez, 76) which is the mutual recognition of the other’s signs of 
attention (Gómez, 73). Indeed, Gómez himself claims that “when we analyze the implications of 
attention contact, it seems that many important later developments are embedded in its structure 
[including] self-consciousness” (Gómez, 77). However, Gómez is also careful to point out that one 
should not succumb to developmental fallacy, the assumption that the identification of a simple 
situation whose structure implies a later situation provides an explanation for the emergence of the 
latter (Gómez, 77). So, as to avoid developmental fallacy, one cannot claim that because attention 
contact implies self-consciousness, this accounts for the mechanism of realization for self-
consciousness (Gómez, 77). One can, however, claim that attention contact “seems to be the key 
to the Gricean structure of intentional communication … moreover, attention contact seems to be 
a seminal situation for the development of self-consciousness” (Gómez, 78). Thereby, intentional 
communication points to the emergence of a sense of self, and as such self-consciousness.  
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3.7 Conclusion  
 In sum, I have demonstrated that the intentional account of communication provides an 
understanding of the communicative utterances of animals that points to a sense of self, and as 
such self-consciousness. In this chapter, I found that animal communication can be used as 
evidence of thinking; and that any account of communication which is employed in the 
investigation animal self-consciousness must indicate that the nature and content of animal minds 
includes a sense of self. I found that both the biological and information-based accounts fail to do 
so: the biological account is too permissive, while the information-based account is silent on the 
nature and content of animal minds more generally. However, I found the intentional account does 
point to a sense of self, as it is largely concerned with the intention of a communicative utterance 
and how animals communicate their thoughts. Indeed, according to the Gricean approach to 
intentional communication, when animals intentionally communicate with one another they think 
about what the other is thinking. Thus, using Gómez’s claim that intentional communication is 
formative of a sense of self, I argued that intentional communication points to animal self-
consciousness. Thus, I have demonstrated that any animal who communicative utterance fits the 
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CHAPTER 4 
Throughout this project, I have argued for three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
for self-consciousness in animals. Those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication 
and (3) collaborative social play. In this chapter I explore the third condition. I begin with a 
reference to the notion that animal social play can be used to investigate the nature and content of 
animal minds. Specifically, I focus on the notion that animal social play can be used to make 
inferences about an animals’ sense of self, and as such the emergence of self-consciousness. Next, 
I investigate how animal social play ought to be defined and focus on Bekoff and Beyer’s (1981) 
definition which makes no reference to functionality. Using this definition, I go on to consider how 
social play can be systematically studied through Colin Allen’s proposal for the attribution of 
concepts to animal and consider animals’ use of play signals to differentiate instances of play from 
instances of non-play. I then investigate two different forms of animal social play, those being self-
handicapping and role reversal, both of which have traditionally been approached as indications 
of an understanding of self. Thus, any animal who exhibits self-handicapping and role-reversal, 
meets the third condition set forth for animal self-consciousness. 
 
4.1 Why Animal Social Play?  
 Philosophers Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff propose that although there are a number of 
collaborative behaviors in the animal kingdom that can be examined, collaborative social play, in 
particular, might be useful in gaining insight into animal minds (Allen and Bekoff, 88-89). Allen 
and Bekoff claim that the empirical investigation of collaborative social play [hereafter: social 
play] yields more significant evidence about the nature and content of animal minds than other 
behaviors. This is because investigation of social play primarily focuses on behavioral patterns, 
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such as cooperation and role-playing, which indicate what is going on “in there” (Allen and Bekoff, 
88). Allen and Bekoff also suggest that behavioral patterns of social play occur across a number 
of animal species, and as such lend themselves to the extension of investigation “beyond the 
narrow focus on primates that often dominates discussions of nonhuman cognition” (Allen and 
Bekoff, 88). They state, “it would be premature to rule out the possibility that the performance of 
these behavior patterns might also be important in the evolution of self-conception in non-
primates” (Allen and Bekoff, 89). That is, social play seems to point to behavioral patterns from 
which inferences about the emergence of consciousness and self-consciousness can be made 
(Allen and Bekoff, 89; Bekoff, 1999). Given Allen and Bekoff’s claims, in this chapter I explore 
social play as the third condition required for animal self-consciousness.  
 
4.2 What is Animal Social Play?  
 When one turns to a discussion of what social play is, it seems there is no simple or unique 
definition. Social play refers to a number of behavioral patterns across animal species, and as such 
is similar to feeding and mating. However, “unlike play, feeding and mating correspond to easily 
identified biological functions” (Allen and Bekoff, 89). Thus, what is unique about social play is 
that it does not have a distinct biological function. Some propose that social play might contribute 
to the improvement of the general skill set of young animals, such that play might contribute to 
the development of motor and cognitive capabilities (Allen and Bekoff, 90). Others propose that 
social play might result in improving hunting, foraging and social abilities, all of which are 
beneficial to the animal across its lifespan (Allen and Bekoff, 90). Furthermore, there are other 
who propose that play “may have different evolved functions in different species and it may have 
different consequences for individuals of different ages and sexes” (Allen and Bekoff, 90). Thus, 
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functional definitions of play “are difficult to formulate … [and some] authors have been tempted 
into defining it as a functionless behavior” (Allen and Bekoff, 89-90).  
 Indeed, in an attempt to provide a definition that makes no reference to functionality, 
Bekoff and Beyers conceive of play in the following way:  
Play is all motor activity performed postnatally that appears to be purposeless, in 
which motor patterns from other contexts may often be used in modified forms and 
altered temporal sequencing. If the activity is directed toward another living being 
is called social play. (Bekoff and Beyers, 1981).    
Bekoff claims this definition “centers on the structure of play sequences – what animals do when 
they play – and not on possible functions of play” (Bekoff, 1999). The structure of play sequences 
varies greatly within and between species of animals, such that the next action in play sequences 
can rarely be accurately predicted; although, “the degree of variability can be affected by the ages 
of participants, their sexes, their social ranks, their social experience, etc.” (Allen and Bekoff, 91). 
This flexibility and variability among play sequences allows for the study of social play to be 
particularly interesting. 
 
4.3 Studying Animal Social Play  
  Bekoff suggests that the study of social play or play sequences is suitable to Allen’s 
proposal for the attribution of concepts to animals (Bekoff, 1999). According to Allen’s proposal:  
An organism O may reasonably be attributed a concept of X whenever: (1) O 
systematically discriminates some instances of X from some non-Xs; (2) O is 
capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors between Xs and non-Xs; 
and (3) O is capable of learning to better discriminate Xs from non-Xs as a 
consequence of its capacity. (Bekoff, 1999) 
For the purpose of this project, the concept X of interest, which can be attributed to an organism 
O, is play. Bekoff suggests that canids, especially coyotes, might be used to demonstrate Allen’s 
proposal. In regard to the first point, coyotes seem to be able to systematically discriminate some 
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instances of play from some instances of non-play by the kind of bites involved in the play 
sequence (Bekoff, 1999). During social play, “bites directed toward the tail, a flank, a leg, the 
abdomen, or the back lasted a significantly shorter time and were more stereotyped… than during 
aggression” (Allen and Bekoff, 98). Coyotes are able to recognize the subtle differences in bite 
timing in order to discriminate instances of play from instances of non-play. With respect to the 
second point, many animals, such as coyotes, are able to identify when they have misidentified an 
instance of play as non-play and vice versa, as exemplified by their use of the play bow which will 
be explored further in the next section (Bekoff, 1999). Finally, in regard to the third point, animals 
seem to become better at discriminating between play and non-play through previous mistakes of 
discrimination (Bekoff, 1999). Through the consideration of Allen’s proposal, it seems the next 
question which must be addressed in relation to animal social play is: how do animals agree to 
play? This question is particularly significant within the context of this project, as the agreement 
to play points to a sense of self. That is, the agreement is dependent on an animal’s ability to 
distinguish between self and other, as well as grasp what the relationship is between self and other 
during the interaction.  
 
4.4 Play Signals: How do Animals Agree to Play?  
 As seen above with coyotes and the discrimination of bites in play and non-play, when 
animals engage in social play, they use behavioral patterns within the play sequence which are 
also used across other contexts (Bekoff, 1999). If the behavioral patterns within the play sequence 
are not intrinsically different from predatory, antipredatory or mating contexts, then how do 
animals agree to play (Allen and Bekoff, 99)? Many animals have evolved play signals, or play 
markers, which are used to reach an agreement to play and to maintain a playful mood throughout 
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the interaction (Allen and Bekoff, 99; Bekoff, 1999). Bekoff claims “play-soliciting signals appear 
to foster some sort of cooperation between players so that each responds to the other in a way 
consistent with play” (Allen and Bekoff, 99). Here, coyotes can be used once again as an example. 
Coyotes react differently to threatening gestures, such as biting and standing over, following a play 
signal compared to in the absence of a play signal (Allen and Bekoff, 99).  
 
4.4.1 Play Bows 
 One oft cited and extensively studied example of a play signal is the canid play bow, which 
is “a highly ritualized and stereotyped movement that seems to function to stimulate recipients to 
engage (or to continue to engage) in social play” (Allen and Bekoff, 99). The notion that play bows 
are stereotyped implies that the way in which they are performed is highly uniform, however, it 
does not imply that play bows are not versatile (Allen and Bekoff, 100). This uniformity is 
important for the purpose of play bows, such that in this way they are less likely to be misidentified 
(Allen and Bekoff, 100). During a play bow, “an individual crouches on its forelimbs, remains 
standing on its hind legs, and may wag its tail and bark… [this] places the head of the bower below 
the head of another animal in an unthreatening position” (Allen and Bekoff, 100). Play bows 
“occur almost exclusively during social play” (Bekoff, 1999) and can occur at any point in the play 
sequence, although they most commonly occur at the beginning of the sequence (Bekoff, 1999). 
While the form of play bows if highly uniform, dependent on when they occur in the play sequence, 
their duration is quite versatile. Allen and Bekoff claim this can be attributed to three explanations, 
(1) that fatigue occurs during play; (2) the performance of preceding postures; and (3) that there is 
less necessity to signal the continuation of play than the initiation of play (Allen and Bekoff, 100). 
One should note that they do not believe these explanations are mutually exclusive (Allen and 
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Bekoff, 100). Regardless of the explanations for the versatility of play bows during play sequences, 
it does seem that play bows in general reinforce and maintain the play mood of the interaction 
(Allen and Bekoff, 103). That is, play bows signal to the other “I want to play… what follows is 
play… [and] this is still play” (Bekoff, 1999), thus allowing for the cooperation between animals 
during social play.  
 
4.5 Forms of Animal Social Play  
4.5.1 Self-Handicapping  
 One behavior pattern which is commonly identified during animal social play is self-
handicapping (Bekoff, 1999). Self-handicapping is a behavior in which one animal purposefully 
inhibits itself during the interaction in order to foster the play mood (Bekoff, 1999; Essler et al., 
2016). Interestingly, self-handicapping does not take into account the “the relative ranks of the 
partners outside of the play context” (Essler et al., 2016); both the dominant and subordinate 
animals might demonstrate self-handicapping during social play. In general, there are three kinds 
of self-handicapping observed in the animal kingdom, “social self-handicapping, when a stronger 
partner takes a disadvantageous position, kinematic self-handicapping, when a partner exhibits a 
physically demanding position, and sensory self-handicapping, when a partner closes its eyes 
while acting” (Essler et al., 2016). Once again, coyotes can be used to demonstrate self-
handicapping behavior. During social play, “a coyote might not bite her play partner as hard as she 
can, or she might not play as vigorously as she can” (Bekoff, 1999). Here, when the coyote does 
not bite with all of its force, or does not play as vigorously as possible, it demonstrates self-
handicapping by taking a disadvantageous position. This, in turn, encourages the play partner to 
continue the interaction in the play mood. Similarly, red neck wallabies seem to demonstrate self-
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handicapping, such that they adjust the way in which they play depending on their play partner’s 
age (Bekoff, 1999). For example, “when a partner was younger, the older animal adopted a 
defensive, flat-footed posture… [and] was more tolerant of its partners tactics” (Bekoff, 1999).  
 
 4.5.2 Role Reversal and Self-Handicapping/Role Reversal Combinations 
 Another behavior pattern which is commonly identified during animal social play is role 
reversal (Bekoff, 1999). In role reversal, “a dominant animal performs an action during play that 
would not normally occur during real aggression” (Bekoff, 1999). A good example of role reversal 
can be observed when companion dogs play with one another. The role reversal occurs when the 
dominant dog rolls over to expose its belly voluntarily, which it would not do outside of the context 
of play (Bekoff, 1999; Smuts, 2014). Indeed, for dogs, rolling over belly up is one of the most 
vulnerable positions they can be in; by doing so voluntarily, the dominant dog demonstrates their 
subordinate position to the play partner (Smuts, 2014). Similarly, in coyote pups rolling over is 
demonstrated as role reversal, where rolling over of the dominant coyote pup occurs exclusively 
in social play contexts (Bekoff, 1999). Yet role reversal and self-handicapping are not entirely 
exclusive; there are some instances in which they occur within the same play sequence (Bekoff, 
1999). For example, the dominant animal might roll over to expose its belly voluntarily, as well as 
not bite their play partner with all of its force (Bekoff, 1999).  
Together, these forms of animal social play occur “as not to allow the interaction to escalate 
into a real fight” (Bekoff, 1999). Recall, that the behavior patterns in play sequences are not unique 
to play contexts, therefore “play sequences are punctuated with behaviors patterns that indicate an 
individual is willing to either handicap himself or engage in role playing” (Bekoff, 1999). This 
willingness points towards the animals’ wish to play, and as such might provide insight into the 
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nature and content of its mind (Bekoff, 1999). Indeed, Bekoff finds “the performance of self-
handicapping and role reversal suggests that an individual is able to make an assessment of himself 
and others and manage or regulate how she plays” (Bekoff, 1999). If Bekoff’s interpretation is 
correct, then the performance of these two forms of social play require that the animal has a sense 
of self and is able to distinguish itself from other. Similarly, Maxeen Biben suggests that 
collaborative social play is used by individuals to “learn strategies of social interaction that are 
related to self-competence and self-preservation” (Bekoff, 1999). Again, here, it becomes evident 
that there is a distinct relationship between social play and a sense of self.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 In sum, I have demonstrated that self-handicapping and role-reversal in animal play 
sequences point towards a sense of self, and as such self-consciousness. In this chapter, I found 
that collaborative social play [again hereafter: social play] might be useful in gaining insight into 
animal minds; and that social play points to behavioral patterns from which inferences about 
animal self-consciousness can be made. Indeed, social play is a particularly interesting behavior 
because it is not directly tied to a biological function. Using Bekoff’s notion that play signals, 
specifically play bows, allow for animals to agree or continue to agree to play, I argued that there 
are two forms of social play of particular interest when investigating animal self-consciousness, 
those being self-handicapping and role-reversal. Recall, that in self-handicapping one animal 
purposefully inhibits itself during the interaction in order to foster the play mood, while role-
reversal the dominant animal performs an action it would not usually perform in an aggressive 
encounter. I found that both of these forms of social play require than an animal have a sense of 
self, and as such self-consciousness, because they presume an ability to distinguish between self 
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and other. Thus, I have demonstrated that any animal who exhibits self-handicapping and role-
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CHAPTER 5 
In this project, I have demonstrated why (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication 
and (3) collaborative social play, are each individually necessary for animal self-consciousness. In 
this chapter, I aim to demonstrate that together they are sufficient, such that the three conditions 
must be understood as necessary and jointly sufficient for self-consciousness. To do so, I 
investigate some of the traditional criticisms against each of the conditions individually. I then find 
that by treating them as jointly sufficient, my proposal overcomes these criticisms; thereby 
providing a new set of conditions which are successful in determining which animals are and are 
not self-conscious. In anticipation of possible objections to my proposal more generally, I turn to 
philosopher Valerie Hardcastle’s response to explanatory gap arguments and view of scientific 
explanations. Hardcastle claims it is not fair to demand that scientific explanations demonstrate 
why an identification or identity statement holds. Indeed, Hardcastle finds that demonstration of 
the identification is explanation enough for scientific theory, a notion I embrace to address the 
following questions:  
1. What is the connection between these three conditions and self-consciousness?  
2. Why is it that these three conditions give rise to self-consciousness? 
3. Why are these three conditions necessary and jointly sufficient for self-consciousness? 
Finally, I provide a demonstration of how my proposal can be implemented through the 
consideration of dolphins as a case example of an animal which meets all three conditions set forth 
in my proposal and is self-conscious.  
 
5.1 Criticisms Against the First Condition: A Complex Nervous System  
 As seen in the second chapter, I argue that centralized attention, the third stage in the 
evolution of the nervous system, is adequately complex for the emergence of animal self-
consciousness. Recall this is because centralized attention demonstrates the functional 
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organization between neurons required to process signals in a meaningful way; and that self-
consciousness is dependent on this meaning. In short, to demonstrate that centralized attention 
meets the first condition for animal self-consciousness, I employ the complexity argument. 
However, in his book Rethinking Consciousness, neuroscientist Michael Graziano discusses the 
traditional criticism of the complexity argument. Graziano states:  
Scholars who write about the evolution of consciousness tend to emphasize a 
gradual increase in the complexity of the brain. It is intuitively tempting to think 
that complexity makes consciousness. In that view, somewhere in the process of 
evolution, the nervous system became so complex that it crossed a threshold, woke 
up, and gained subjectivity. If that is true, then the question of consciousness turns 
into a matter of finding the threshold – always a slippery slope. (Graziano, 36)  
In this passage, Graziano elegantly describes the complexity argument: the argument claims that 
at some stage in the evolution of the nervous system there is a threshold at which consciousness, 
or self-consciousness, arises as a result of an adequate complexity of the nervous system (again, 
this is the argument I make in the second chapter). He also describes the traditional criticism of 
this argument: finding this threshold for consciousness, or self-consciousness, is always 
problematic (Graziano, 36).  
Graziano attributes the problematic nature of finding this threshold to human emotional 
biases (Graziano, 37). For example, if one rules out fish as being conscious because one assumes 
their nervous system lacks complexity, perhaps an expert in the realm of fish nervous systems 
would find that this assumption is mistaken; that fish do have the necessary complexity, and so 
that they are indeed conscious (Graziano, 36-37). Thus, Graziano claims that the threshold for 
consciousness, and self-consciousness, is always “subject to human whim” (Graziano, 37). 
Following this, Graziano states:  
Once you start with the intuition that consciousness arises naturally from complex 
information processing, it’s hard not to slip into panpsychism, the belief that 
everything in the universe is conscious at least to some degree. By replacing 
consciousness with information and complexity, properties that are literally 
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everywhere and in everything, we are left to slide up and down the slippery scale. 
(Graziano, 37) 
Given this criticism, one might wonder why I maintain that a complex nervous system is the first 
condition for animal self-consciousness. I believe that a complex nervous system is nonetheless 
necessary, although not sufficient for self-consciousness, such that the other two conditions 
prevent the slip into panpsychism Graziano is concerned about. Indeed, a complex nervous system 
is necessary for self-consciousness for a very simple reason. It provides an internal control system 
which “depicts the self as containing an amorphous, non-physical, internal power, an ability to 
know, to experience, and to respond” (Graziano, 43). Furthermore, it provides an animal with the 
“requisite information to lay claim to a subjective experience, [and so self-consciousness] finally 
becomes relevant” (Graziano, 44). Thus, for self-consciousness to become relevant, it seems a 
complex nervous system certainly is necessary, although only sufficient in the simultaneous 
occurrence with the other two conditions, communication and collaborative social play.  
 
5.2 Criticisms Against the Second and Third Conditions: Communication and Social Play  
 As seen in the third chapter, I argue that communication as described by the intentional 
account is seminal to the emergence of self-consciousness. Recall that the Gricean approach to 
intentional communication finds that when animals intentionally communicate with one another, 
they think about what the other is thinking. Indeed, Gómez’s interpretation of the Gricean approach 
emphasizes a mutual awareness and attention contact which points to a sense of self, and as such 
self-consciousness. In short, to demonstrate that intentional communication meets the second 
condition for animal self-consciousness, I argue that communicative utterances can be used to 
make inferences about a sense of self. However, the notion of depending on the nature of 
communicative utterances as a means of inference for animal self-consciousness has traditionally 
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met certain criticisms and is often discouraged by cognitive ethologists. Cognitive ethologists 
follow a tradition in which there is a “conviction that all animal communication is a direct result 
of internal physiological states that are not under any sort of conscious control” (Griffin, 155). 
That is, they do not believe communication provides insight into the nature and content of animal 
minds, and so they claim it cannot be used to infer animal self-consciousness. Another related 
criticism stems from the view that the communicative utterances of animals might merely be 
“predictive information that leads to an appropriate response on the part of the animal” (Griffin, 
155). This criticism supposes that animals communicate in a manner that does not indicate whether 
they are or are not conscious of their utterance; and that instead, they communicate in a manner 
that suggests they are merely simple, behaviorist organisms (Griffin, 155).  
The above criticisms against using communicative utterances to make inferences about 
self-consciousness, are quite similar to the criticisms against using collaborative social play for the 
same purpose. Recall that in the fourth chapter, I argue the two most commonly observed forms 
of animal social play, self-handicapping and role reversal, can be used to infer self-consciousness. 
That is, self-handicapping and role reversal reflect an animal’s ability to monitor its own sense of 
self, as well as the ability to distinguish self from other. Oft-cited criticisms against this inference 
focus on the following question: how can one be certain that animals are in any way aware of the 
meaning of the play sequence or “are they simply conditioned to respond” (Bekoff, 1999)? Thus, 
given these criticisms, one might again wonder why I maintain that communication and 
collaborative social play are the second and third conditions for animal self-consciousness. Just as 
in the discussion of the first condition, I believe that communication and social play are necessary, 
although individually not sufficient for self-consciousness. Indeed, the presence of an audience in 
communication and the presence of a play partner in social play show that animals are not merely 
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conditioned to respond (Griffin, 155); and instead, that the communication and social play of 
animals operates from an ability to distinguish self from other. Thus, for self-consciousness to 
become relevant, it seems communication and collaborative social play are necessary and 
sufficient in the simultaneous occurrence with the first condition, a complex nervous system.  
 
5.3 Three Conditions: Necessary and Jointly Sufficient  
 In the two preceding sections, I have addressed several potential criticisms against each of 
the three conditions proposed for self-consciousness. I have also offered an argument against each 
of the potential criticisms to demonstrate that each condition individually is necessary for self-
consciousness. However, each condition alone is not sufficient. That is, these conditions must 
occur for the emergence of self-consciousness, but their occurrence alone does not guarantee self-
consciousness; they are only sufficient when then occur simultaneously. As jointly sufficient 
conditions, if an animal meets all three conditions, one may conclude that the animal is self-
consciousness. Likewise, if an animal is assumed to be self-conscious, one may conclude that it 
meets all three conditions. To demonstrate the necessary and jointly sufficient nature of the 
conditions, it might be helpful to consider what form this would take. Let N represent the first 
condition – a complex nervous system. Let C represent the second condition – communication. 
And let P represent the third condition – collaborative social play. If animal X exhibits N alone, 
although N is necessary for self-consciousness, one may conclude that animal X is not self-
conscious. Similarly, if animal X exhibits C and P, although both C and P are individually 
necessary for self-consciousness, one may conclude that animal X is still not self-conscious. 
However, if animal X exhibits N, C and P, because these three conditions are individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient, one may conclude that animal X is self-conscious. In the same 
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way, if animal X is self-conscious, then one may conclude that it meets N, C and P; animal X 
would not exhibit only a subset of those conditions. Thus, I arrive at an identity statement in my 
proposal for self-consciousness, namely self-consciousness is N + C + P, and N + C + P is self-
consciousness.  
 
5.4 Hardcastle and Explanatory Gap Arguments  
In this project, I have taken recourse to a highly empirical approach in developing a theory 
of animal self-consciousness, culminating in the following identity statement: self-consciousness 
= a complex nervous system + communication + collaborative social play. In this way, I follow 
philosopher Valerie Hardcastle who is a committed materialist in the study of consciousness 
(Hardcastle, 1996). Hardcastle believes “that consciousness is part of the natural world, but surely 
is completely mysterious” (Hardcastle, 1996). Hardcastle also believes that the best approach to 
the study of consciousness is an empirical one, “to isolate the causal influences or components 
with respect to consciousness and model them” (Hardcastle, 1996). This is what I have done in 
this project; I have isolated the three conditions or components of self-consciousness, those being 
(1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication and (3) collaborative social play. Indeed, this 
is how I arrived at the identity statement that self-consciousness = a complex nervous system + 
communication + collaborative social play, or self-consciousness = N + C + P. However, a 
philosopher who demands more out of a theory of consciousness might find that my theory is 
incomplete; while I have successfully identified the components of self-consciousness, I have not 
explained why it is that N + C + P give rise to self-consciousness or why this identity holds 
(Hardcastle, 1996). That is, I have not bridged the explanatory gap that exists between mind and 
body. Hardcastle states the following: 
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[This] is, of course, exactly right: scientific theories of consciousness won’t explain 
the weirdness of consciousness to those who find the identity weird… To put it 
bluntly: their failure to appreciate the world as it really is cuts no ice with science. 
Their ideas are at fault, not the scientific method. Materialists presume that there is 
some sort of identity statement for consciousness. (Hardcastle, 1996).  
Given that the scientific method is not at fault, Hardcastle claims it would be a mistake to require 
that scientific explanation, or theory of self-consciousness for the purpose of this project, is able 
to explain why the identity statement holds. For example, other identity statements in science, such 
as water = H2O, are not required to provide explanation, they are simply accepted (Hardcastle, 
1996). Thus, I follow Hardcastle’s idea and claim that it would be unfair to require an explanation 
of why self-consciousness = N + C + P, it is simply so. All one can propose to explain is that the 
“understanding of consciousness [and as such self-consciousness] will someday be embedded in 
some larger mind-brain framework” (Hardcastle, 1996).  
 
5.5 Application of the Three Conditions   
Here, it would be helpful to demonstrate how my proposal can be applied to determine 
whether an animal is or is not self-conscious. For this purpose, I turn to dolphins as an example of 
an animal which meets all three conditions set forth in my proposal for animal self-consciousness. 
In the second chapter, I demonstrated that any animal whose nervous system has the capacity for 
centralized attention, meets the first condition for self-consciousness: a complex nervous system. 
Recall that centralized attention is characterized by multimodal signal integration. The dolphin 
brain has two cerebral hemispheres which are connected by the corpus collosum, a bundle of 
nerves that transmit signals across hemispheres for central integration (Leatherwood and Reeves, 
1990). Furthermore, much like the human brain, the dolphin brain is made up of various lobes with 
specialized functions: the sensory cortex maps physiological stimuli, while different layers in the 
visual cortex map different kinds of visual stimuli (light, orientation, color, etc.) (Leatherwood and 
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Reeves, 1990). The stimuli mapped in each hemisphere and lobe are then centrally integrated, as 
is characteristic of centralized attention. Thus, I find that dolphins meet the first condition, as their 
nervous system has the capacity for centralized attention. 
Meanwhile, in the third chapter, I demonstrated that any animal whose communicative 
utterance fits the intentional account of communication, meets the second condition for self-
consciousness: communication. Although I already examined the communicative utterances of 
dolphins in the third chapter, it is worth reiterating, here, why they fit the intentional account. At 
an early age, dolphins develop a signature whistle, which other dolphins in the pod learn to identify 
and recognize as representing that individual (Andrews, 125). Dolphins use these signature 
whistles along with other clicks and whistles to maintain group cohesion, and to communicate 
important information to others about their location, or the location of food or a threat (Tyack, 
1997). As the communicative utterances of dolphins contain referential properties, are intended to 
have an effect and are about something, these utterances fit the intentional account. Therefore, I 
find that dolphins meet the second condition for self-consciousness, such that their communicative 
utterances are intentional. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter, I demonstrated that any animal who exhibits self-
handicapping and role-reversal, meets the third condition set forth: collaborative social play. 
Dolphins often exemplify self-handicapping and role-reversal in various play sequences, such play 
fights or chases, play feeding and wave riding (Janik, 2015). Indeed, in the article Why do Dolphins 
Play, Stand Kuczaj and Holli Eskelinen observe the following:  
During social play, an older and/or more adept animal [dolphin] may opt to 
handicap itself to both encourage playful interactions with a younger animal and to 
avoid injuring the youngster. If the dolphins are playing a social game, such as 
playfighting or play-mating, the more dominant animal may play a subordinate role, 
such role reversals being rarely observed outside of the play context. (Kuczaj and 
Eskelinen, 2014) 
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Self-handicapping is particularly common during play fights and chases, in which dolphins 
charge through the water at one another without harming one another (Janik, 2015). Meanwhile, 
during play feeding, older and younger dolphins alternate hunting positions as an example of 
role-reversal (Janik, 2015). I again find that dolphins meet the third condition set forth, such that 
they demonstrate both self-handicapping and role-reversal during social play. Ultimately, 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 In this project, I have developed a theory of animal self-consciousness which provides a 
means of distinguishing between animals which are and are not self-conscious. I have proposed 
that there are three conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient for animal self-
consciousness, those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication, and (3) 
collaborative social play. I have found that these conditions are each individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient, such that if an animal meets all three conditions, they are self-conscious. 
Likewise, if an animal is self-conscious, they necessarily meet all three conditions. But one might 
wonder, does it really matter whether any animal is self-conscious? Similarly, does it matter which 
animals are self-conscious and under which conditions (Griffin, 234)? In an important sense I 
believe the answer to those questions is yes. Indeed, there are three reasons why I believe one 
ought to concern oneself with animal self-consciousness. 
  The first reason stems from philosophical curiosity, where “an understanding of animal 
minds [and self-consciousness], presumably would inform the understanding of our own” (Vitti, 
2010). In this way, the philosophical importance of animal self-consciousness “lies in its relevance 
to the general question of other minds and difficult questions of how to define and identify 
consciousness” (Griffin, 233). Indeed, questions about consciousness and self-consciousness often 
stem from philosophical attempts to locate humans in nature (“Animal Consciousness,” 2016), and 
are rooted in the notion that humans are distinct from other animals (Vitti, 2010). In the traditional 
philosophical sense, at least in the West, that which distinguishes humans from other animals is 
the uniquely human endowment of consciousness and self-consciousness (“Animal 
Consciousness,” 2016). However, my proposal expands the endowment of self-consciousness to 
other animals. Thus, through the careful consideration of animal self-consciousness and the 
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reasonable conditions for its emergence, this project contributes to philosophical discourse about 
consciousness and other minds more generally.  
 The second reason why one ought to concern oneself with animal self-consciousness stems 
from ethical concerns that surround animal suffering. For example, “hardly anyone denies that 
there is a large ethical difference between torturing a dog or monkey and mutilating even the most 
elaborate and efficient machine” (Griffin, 245). This is rooted in the belief that animals consciously 
suffer in a way that machines do not, that is, this is painful to me. So, it seems we frequently make 
value judgements about animal suffering that inform our decisions about trade-offs concerning 
welfare (Griffin, 246). Take two extreme cases: one in which a promising medical procedure is 
tested on an anesthetized rat and to another in which an elephant is left crippled because it is hunted 
for ivory (Griffin, 251). While the former trade-off seems warranted because human benefit is 
greater than animal suffering (although that itself is debatable too), the latter is certainly an 
“unwarranted indulgence in minor human satisfaction at the expense of considerable suffering” 
(Griffin, 251). Yet most cases do not necessarily align with either extreme. Thus, the question 
remains: “how should we actually implement change to accommodate conscious [or self-
conscious] animals” (Vitti, 2010). Although I cannot hope to resolve this rather complex, but 
immensely important issue here; this project, in its expansion of the endowment of self-
consciousness to other animals, contributes to ethical considerations of animal suffering.  
 Meanwhile, the third and final reason why I believe one ought to concern oneself with 
animal self-consciousness stems from its scientific significance. Within the animal kingdom there 
are millions of species of non-human animals, indeed:  
For this alone it is important to understand animals as fully as possible; for without 
such understanding we will remain blind to an important aspect of reality. We 
cannot understand animal fully without know what their subjective experience are 
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like… In its own right, [this is] an important reason to inquire as deeply and 
critically as we can into the subjects discussed [animals]. (Griffin, 252) 
Within the passage the relevance of scientific curiosity into animal self-consciousness becomes 
evident, such that non-human animals comprise the majority of animal kingdom and ought to be 
fully understood. Further, “much of twentieth-century science has gradually slipped into an 
attitude that belittles nonhuman animals” (Griffin, 252). Through its expansion of the endowment 
of self-consciousness to other animals, this project actively functions to counteract this slip in 
scientific literature.  
Ultimately, I am confident that my proposal of the three necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for animal self-consciousness, those being (1) a complex nervous system, (2) 
communication and (3) collaborative social play, contributes to philosophical, ethical and 
scientific investigations of consciousness more generally. Indeed, I believe in its expansion of the 
endowment of self-consciousness beyond humans to other animals, it is a continuation of a long-
term learning and change in perspective away from a human-centric view to something much more 
diverse and inclusive. In this way, this project moves away from a perspective of human singularity 
and exceptionalism, and lays the groundwork for an inclusive investigation into questions 
including the following: what it is like to be animal X and how one ought to go about animal 
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